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IMPACT OF U.C.C. ARTICLE NINE ON REVENUE BOND
INVESTMENTS
Among a plethora of variations which compromise the "uniformity"
of the Uniform Commercial Code' are a number of recent amendments
by state legislatures to exclude certain public securities from the scope
of Article Nine.2 Such initiatives may well suggest to other lawmakers
the wisdom of exploring the possible impact of Article Nine on their own
public securities and encourage even more widespread amendatory legis-
lation.'
The source of the potential difficulties envisioned by those states
which have enacted exclusionary amendments is the comprehensiveness
of the Article Nine "security interest," which is defined as "an interest
in personal property . . . which secures payment or performance of an
obligation." The concept includes "any interest of a buyer of accounts,
chattel paper, or contract rights which is subject to Article Nine."'
The scope of Article Nine itself is presented in the following terms:
(1) Except as otherwise provided ... this Article applies so far
as concerns any personal property and fixtures within the
jurisdiction of this state (a) to any transaction (regardless of
its form) which is intended to create a security interest in
personal property or fixtures, including goods, documents, in-
struments, general intangibles, chattel paper, accounts or con-
tract rights.5
As Professor Gilmore has noted, "all 'transactions . . . intended to
create a security interest,' as subdivision (1) puts it or 'all security
interests created by contract,' in the subsection (2) version, are brought
under one roof. . . ." As a consequence, "if the 'transaction' is one
'intended to create a security interest' " it necessarily must result in
"an Article Nine security interest, subject to Article Nine rules, the Article
Nine metaphysics and, most importantly, the Article Nine filing
1. UNIFORM CO-MIERCIAL CODE § 1-102(1) (c) states that the purpose of the Code
is "to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions."
2. See notes 32 and 46 infra.
3. The fact that the possible subjection of public securities to Article Nine rules
has not been litigated and thus remains problematic should not induce legislative
indifference to the potential difficulties, for "[courts] have recognized the policy embodied
in an act as applicable in reason to subject matter which was not expressly included in
the language of the Act." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-102, Comment 1.
4. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201 (37).
5. UNIFORM CO MIERCIAL CODE § 9-102.
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systems."' Noting that Article Nine is "a statute drafted to regulate
[only] certain well-known or institutionalized types of financing trans-
actions," Gilmore concludes, "It is fair enough to say that a transaction
which sets out to be one of those types should conform to the Article Nine
rules or fall by the wayside."7
The consequences of falling by the wayside include the subordination
of a security interest which does not conform to Article Nine rules to
the rights of certain third persons, including lien creditors.8 It is there-
fore incumbent upon those responsible for the administration of certain
public securities to determine whether such securities may fairly be con-
sidered to be included within Article Nine.
The specific focus of this note is on the impact of Article Nine on
revenue bond investments with special reference to Indiana issues. Such
bonds are defined as
the special obligations of political subdivisions, municipal and
public corporations which are payable solely from the revenues
of an income-producing public project or system and issued for
the purpose of financing the acquisition, construction, extension
or improvement of such project or system.'
The use of revenue bond financing enjoys popularity as a means of
circumventing Section one of Article thirteen of the Indiana Constitution,
which prohibits political or municipal corporations from becoming in-
debted in an amount in excess of two per cent of the taxable property
within the corporation, since it does not commit the general revenues of
the corporation."0 Authority to issue revenue bonds is given by the
6. G. GILMOEo, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 296 (1965). Professor
Gilmore was a member of the subcommittee of the Permanent Editorial Board to consider
Article Nine. The use of the term "metaphysics" to describe the more abstruse pro-
visions of Article Nine is especially apt in view of the uncertainties which lie in the yet
unexplored frontiers of the revamped law of secured transactions.
7. Id. 336-37.
8. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-301. See especially § 9-301 (1) (b) which
subordinates an unperfected security interest to the claims of lien creditors. The term
"perfected" is used to describe a security interest which cannot be defeated in insolvency
proceedings or in general by creditors. A security interst is perfected when it has
attached and when all of the applicable steps required for perfection have been taken.
Id. § 9-303.
9. Zwerner, Indiana Muticipal Revenue Bond Financing, 12 IND. L.J. 266 n.1
(1937). This definition was so constructed to exclude "any reference to revenue bonds in
the sense of general obligations, special taxing district obligations, short-term bonds,
notes, special assessments or warrants issued in anticipation of general or other
ordinary revenues."
10. Letz Mfg. Co. v. Public Service Commission of Indiana, 210 Ind. 467, 4 N.E.2d
194 (1936). However, "the scheme in nowise involves an evasion of the spirit or purpose
of the constitutional provision." Edwards v. Housing Authority of City of Muncie, 215
Ind. 330, 338, 19 N.E.2d 741, 745 (1939).
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Indiana legislature on an ad hoc basis,' and "the rights and remedies of
the bondholders are to be determined from the terms of the bonds and of
the ordinance [implementing] the issue.' 1 2 Legislation authorizing a
bond issue typically provides that such bonds shall be payable from and
secured by a lien upon the revenues of the income-producing enterprise. "
In some cases, the secured party is granted a statutory mortgage lien upon
the facilities of the enterprise. 4 With few exceptions, the authorizing
statute sets interest limits, restricts the maturity period, provides that the
bonds shall be payable only from specified revenues, recites that the bonds
shall not constitute an indebtedness of the municipality and grants to the
bonds the qualities of negotiable instruments."
The statutes providing authority for the issuance of revenue bonds
generally provide that the bond shall be secured by a lien on the revenues
of the utility or authority. Under prior law this lien was secure against
most rival claimants by reason of the Indiana rule that priority in time is
priority in right.'" If, however, the security interest created by the
authorizing statutes is within Article Nine, and unless the security
interest can be perfected in accordance with section 9-402, the bond-
holder's prior lien will be subordinated to certain third parties.17 Thus,
the effect of Article Nine may be to negate the abundant remedies
afforded the bondholder by the authorizing statutes and the prior law,'8
thus upsetting the expectations of bondholders who had relied on the
11. The specific question of whether a political or municipal corporation could
issue such bonds in an exercise of its recognized inherent discretionary powers does not
appear to have arisen and, as far as can be determined, such bonds have never been
issued in this state without express statutory authority. Zwerner, supra note 9, at 274.
12. 21 IND. L. ENcv. Municipal Corporations §560 (1959). By general rule, the
enactment implementing the bond issue, if not incompatible with the authorization
statute or the bond itself, is part of the contract between the issuing authority and the
purchaser. Summey v. City of Ames, 251 Ia. 1199, 104 N.W.2d 617 (1960).
13. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-4314 (Burns Supp. 1968); and §§ 48-5319,
48-5337, 48-5357, 48-5440, 48-7119, 48-7301, 48-8434 and 48-8477 (Burns 1963 Repl.).
14. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 28-5717 (Burns 1948 Repl.) and 28-5723 (Burns
Supp. 1969) ; 48-7301 and 48-8435 (Bruns 1963 Repl.).
15. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 48-5319, 48-5328, 48-5357, 48-5440, 48-8434 and
48-8477 (Burns 1963 Repl.).
16. 18 IND. L. ENcy. Liens § 5 (1959).
17. See note 8 supra.
18. See text accompanying note 16 supra and note 36 infra. In addition to the
remedies expressly assured the bondholder, other methods of protecting his interest were
afforded by prior law. While he apparently could not seek attachment of the funds of the
income-producing enterprise prior to obtaining a judgment, [IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-501(Burns 1968 Repl.)] he conceivably could assert an adverse claim against the bank
deposits of the enterprise [IND. ANN. STAT. § 18-2001 (Burns 1968 Supp.)]. Had he
pursued his claim to judgment, the bondholder, as a judgment creditor, could have
reached both money in possession of the debtor and money of the debtor in a bank by
proceedings supplementary to execution. Cf. Baker v. State ex. rel. Mills, 109 Ind. 47, 9
N.E. 711 (1887), D.L. Adams Co. v. Federal Glass Co., 180 Ind. 576, 103 N.E. 414
(1913).
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continued viability of the pre-Code law by subjecting investments worth
millions of dollars to unanticipated risks. 9 Since even a remote prospect
of such consequences would greatly undermine confidence in an essential
and popular method of public financing, the urgency of resolving the
question becomes apparent.
Those state legislatures which have troubled to exclude such public
securities from the coverage of Article Nine evidently have concluded that
the article perhaps may be construed to embrace such securities." Giving
broad sweep to the language of the article, the argument for inclusion
may begin with the premise that security interest means an interest in
personal property which secures payment or performance of an obliga-
tion.2 Since personal property includes everything that is subject to
ownership not coming under the denomination of realty,2 2 the revenues
of a public enterprise may be termed personal property. Since revenue
bonds are secured by an interest in personal property-the revenues of
the enterprise-which secures payment or performance of an obligation,
they fall within the general denomination of "security interest." The
argument for including such securities within Article Nine is completed
by reference to Gilmore's contention that any security interest created ill
the course of institutionalized types of financing is ipso facto under
Article Nine.2' Some commentators, however, have seemed to require
that the security interest be in a specific category of collateral specified in
section 9-102 despite the fact that the use of the prefacing term "includ-
ing" would suggest that the list is not exhaustive. Since the nature of the
collateral has relevance to the method of perfecting the security interest, -2 4
the attempt to read the section 9-102 list as exhaustive is far from a
19. Some indication of the dimensions of the problem can be seen in the fact that,
as of December 31, 1966, Indiana Toll Road Commission revenue bonds outstanding
totalled some 250 million dollars, and total Indiana revenue bonds outstanding probably
total twice that figure. MOODY'S MUNICIPAL & GOVERNMENT MANUAL 847 et seq. (F. St.
Clair ed. Feb. 1968). Whatever continued viability there is in the doctrine of sovereign
immunity poses no bar to suits against the income-producing enterprises whose revenues
secure such bonds, for they are considered public corporate entities separate from the
state as a sovereign corporate entity. Indiana State Toll Bridge Comm'n v. Minor, 236
Ind. 193, 139 N.E.2d 445 (1957).
20. The argument for including the securities within Article Nine is not predicated
upon the intention. of the drafters or the legislature to so embrace them. Rather, it is
based on statutory language which, through its breadth, creates a plausible cause for
their inclusion. See note 3 infra.
Little indication appears as to the extent to which exclusionary legislation was
prompted by belief that coverage could reasonably be inferred from the language of the
Code rather than by a desire to remove all uncertainty however remote. See note 32
infra.
21. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL. CODE § 1-201 (37).
22. J. CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 9 (1962).
23. See text accompanying note 6 supra.
24. UNIFORM_ COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-102, Comment.
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harmless error.
Reading the list of section 9-102 collateral as exhaustive has forced
Peter Coogan,2" in discussing the applicability of Article Nine to revenue
bond financing, to assume that the original collateral is money" and that
if section 9-102 is construed literally there may be a security interest in
money. Although deposit accounts are specifically excluded from Article
Nine -7 and money is excluded from the definition of "goods" in section
9-102, Article Nine applies to all personal property within the jurisdiction
of the state. Of the remaining categories of collateral the only possibilities
are "instruments" and "general intangibles.""8 He concludes that money
may be considered an "instrument":
Both a negotiable instrument and the 'other writings' referred
to [in the section 9-105(1) (g)] definition must be writings
payable in money. At least some forms of paper money are
writings that may themselves be payable in money, and, with
some stretching, the word 'writings' can cover coins .... Ad-
mittedly there are problems, but if money must be forced into
one Article Nine category, the category that most nearly carries
out the purposes of Article Nine is instruments.29
"Section 9-309, read imaginatively," he declares, "answers most ques-
tions as to the rights of holders, and conflicts are held to a vanishing
point" because of perfection by possession.
Coogan's analysis, however, would appear to create as many con-
flicts as it resolves. A bondholder, faced with the prospect of competing
claims, probably would not be comforted to learn that his security interest
25. P. COOGAN, W. HOGAN & D. VAGTS, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 23.09 (1963). Mr. Coogan served as a member of the
Permanent Editorial Board to consider Article Nine.
26. Under current financing patterns, governmental units and other entities
issue bonds that do not commit their general credit, but are payable from, and
secured by, toll revenues, water department revenues, college tuitions, dormitory
rents, and so forth. Lawyers wrestling with these forms of financing have
called attention to uncertainties about whether Article Nine covers money and
deposits as collateral and, if so, what rules apply to the perfection of security
interests therein.
Id., at 2338.
27. UNIFORM COIMMERCIAL CODE § 9-104(k).
28. Every effort must be made to avoid calling money a general intangible,
since one bizarre result of this classification would be that a secured party could
perfect a security interest in money simply by filing a financing statement.
Nobody could deal with money without making a search in the appropriate Code
filing office.
P. COOGAN, supra note 25, § 23.09, at 2389.
29. Id. at 2389-90.
30. Id. at 2390. See UNIFORM COMIMERCIAL CODE § 9-304, which requires a security
interest in instruments to be perfected only by possession.
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in the revenues of a public enterprise could be perfected only through
possession. Unless the debtor could be considered to hold the revenues for
the bondholder under a constructive trust theory, the security interest
would remain unperfected and the revenues would remain subject to
competing claims of a non-consenual character until they were actually
paid to the bondholder." Faced with such a prospect, those interested in
protecting the bondholder's interest would appear to have no alternative
but to urge the total exclusion of revenue bonds from the coverage of
Article Nine."
However, an alternative to total exclusion appears if the characteriza-
tion of the original collateral in revenue bond financing as money is
defeated. An indication that such a characterization is erroneous arises
from the fact that Article Nine seems to comprehend a distinction between
the collateral and that which will satisfy the obligation while, under
Coogan's analysis, that which satisfies the obligation and the collateral
itself are identical. Article Nine contains no language which envisions
such a unity, and the textbook examples of Article Nine applicability
clearly suppose a requisite duality.3 Indeed, the types of collateral
enumerated in section 9-102 are obviously something distinct from that
31. A trust-fund doctrine has been imposed on municipalities which issue special
assessment bonds. The municipality becomes a trustee of funds resulting from collection
under special assessments and is charged with all attending fiduciary duties. Sampson v.
Village of Stickney, 30 IlI. App. 2d 13,173 N.E.2d 577 (1961), rev'd on other grounds
24 Ill. 2d 134, 180 N.E.2d 457 (1962). The trust theory would afford some protection to
the bondholder if he were found to have a security interest which need not be perfected
by filing since the "trustee" would have possession. Perhaps more significantly, it would
serve the same purpose if the bondholder were considered not to possess an Article Nine
security interest at all. It is not necessary to rely exclusively on the constructive trust,
since some revenue bond schemes either explicitly provide for a trust or specify that the
agreement shall be construed to create a trust. Highland, Ind. Ordinance 447, Dec. 19,
1960; Indiana State Toll Bridge Comm'n to American Fletcher National Bank & Trust
Co., Trust Agreement, January 1, 1965.
32. Such a course has been followed by those states enacting amendments to section
9-104. The California enactment is representative:
[This Article does not apply]
(1) To any security interest created by the state, any county, city and county,
city, municipal corporation, public district, public authority, or any subdivision.
CAL. CoMM. CODE § 9104 (West Supp. 1968). See also ALA. CODE tit. 7A, § 9-104
(1966); ALASKA STAT. § 45.05.696 (Supp. 1968) ; GA. CODE ANN. § 109A-9-104 (Supp.
1968); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 6A-9-104 (1956); and Wis. STAT. ANN. § 409.104
(1964). A comment to the California amendment notes
The 1967 amendment to this section adds a new subdivision (1) for the purpose
of making it clear that public securities are not included in the transactions
referred to in Article nine.
Report of the Advisory Committee, Senate Journal, April 20, 1967, at 1238-39. The
California amendment apparently was urged by attorneys who advise underwriters of
public securities. Although contending such securities to be outside the scope of Article
Nine, the Advisory Committee preferred to preclude the question from litigation. 41
CAL. S.B.J. 792 (1966).
33. J. HoNNoLD, SALES AND SALES FINANCING 428-30 (1962).
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which will satisfy the obligation. Only the most tortured construction
permits Coogan to say that a security interest in an instrument can be
satisfied by that very instrument because, inasmuch as money is a writing
payable in money, instruments include money.
It imposes far less strain on the language of Article Nine to view
money, not as the original collateral, but as proceeds of the original
collateral. "Proceeds" is defined to include "whatever is received when
collateral or proceeds is sold, exchanged, collected or otherwise disposed
of,"34 while "collateral" itself is defined as "the property subject to a
security interest [including] accounts, contract rights and chattel paper
which have been sold." ' It is therefore possible to envision the collateral
as changing in its form along a temporal continuum. A "contract
right"36 matures into an "account ' 37 which yields "proceeds" in the form
of money." An approach more orthodox than Coogan's would char-
acterize the collateral of a revenue bondholder as being represented
initially by the contract right arising out of the relationship between the
income-producing enterprise and its customers, then by the account
receivable on performance by the enterprise, and finally by the cash
proceeds collected by the enterprise.3"
The major hurdle to overcome in thus characterizing the revenue
bondholder's security interest is the statutory recital that such bonds are
secured solely by the revenues of the enterprise. On its face, such a
recital might be construed to mean that the bondholder has no interest
until such revenues actually accrue. Closer analysis, however, suggests
that such a conclusion appears unfounded, for the authorizing statutes and
ordinances also grant the bondholder an interest not confined to realized
revenues. Statutory provisions requiring the issuing authority to set aside
that proportion of potential revenues necessary to satisfy bond obligations
and recognizing the right of the bondholder to compel payment preclude
the restrictive view that the bondholder has no interest until revenues are
34. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-306(1).
35. Id. at § 9-105(c).
36. "'Contract right' means any right to payment under a contract not yet earned
by performance and not evidenced by an instrument or chattel paper." Id. § 9-106.
37. "'Account' means any right to payment for goods sold or leased or for services
rendered which is not evidenced by an instrument or chattel paper." Id.
38. "Contract rights may be regarded as potential accounts: they become accounts
as performance is made under the contract." Id. § 9-106, Comment.
39. See note 13 supra. Of course, this analysis is only appropriate to those types
of income-producing enterprises which maintain accounts with their customers. Absent
the "contract right" and "account receivable" aspects, the original collateral admittedly is
"money," but as has been demonstrated, a security interest in "money" need not be
characterized as a security interest in "instruments" perfectible only by possession.
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realized." Thus a more reasonable construction of statutes authorizing
revenue bonds is the suggestion that a right in revenues implies a right
in antecedent collateral. The consequences of Coogan's analysis thereby
can be avoided. If the bondholder's original collateral is in a contract
right, then the security interest attaches as soon as the debtor has rights
in the collateral." In the case of contract rights, the debtor has rights as
soon as the contract has been made.4 Unlike an interest in instruments,
a security interest in a contract right may be perfected by filing a financing
statement.4 MIoreover, a perfected security interest in a contract right
remains perfected despite the evolution in the form of the collateral along
the temporal continuum. "
Such an analysis creates an alternative to total exclusion through
amendment of section 9-104. If the objection to including such security
interests within Article Nine is that the filing requirement is unduly
burdensome and the consequences for failing to file unduly harsh, a pos-
sible solution would be to exempt them from the filing requirement by an
amendment to section 9-302." This alternative also would be appropriate,
regardless of the characterization of collateral as altering with the passage
of time, if the categories of collateral in section 9-102 are considered
merely illustrative and a security interest in the revenues is considered
to be included within the general terms of that section. Under such a
construction, these security interests would be subject to the filing require-
ment of Article Nine since they are not expressly exempted by section
9-302.4"
40. See IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 48-5313, 48-5321, 48-5334 and 48-8478 (Burns 1963
Repl.) ; Highland, Ind. Ordinance 447, Dec. 19, 1960.
41. UNIFOR. COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-204(1).
42. Id. § 9-204(2) (c).
43. Id. § 9-302.
44. Id. § 9-306(c).
45. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-402 sets out the formal requisites of a financing
statement, filed by the secured party, necessary to perfect a security interest subject to
perfection by filing, consisting primarily of signatures and addresses of both parties
and a description of the collateral by type or item. Perhaps the major argument for
exempting the bondholder from the filing requirement is the sheer volume of paperwork
which would innundate the filing offices were such securities subjected to the filing
requirement.
46. Virginia is representative of those states which have elected the
alternative of excluding a certain range of security interests in such enterprises:
(5) The filing provisions of this title do not apply to a security interest in
property of any description or any interest therein created by a deed of trust
or mortgage by a public service corporation . . . but the deed of trust or
mortgage shall be recorded and filed in the county or corporation in which
such deed of trust or mortgage is required ... to be recorded.
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9-302 (Supp. 1968). See also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN'. § 44-3123
(Supp. 1968), GA. CODE ANN. § 109A-9-302 (Supp. 1968), Ky. REv. STAT. § 355.9-302
(Supp. 1968) and Mo. ANN. STAT. § 400-9-302 (1965). Since some Indiana statutes
authorizing revenue bonds permit the bonds to be secured by mortgages, the Virginia
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Thus a rationale exists under the Code for including revenue bonds
under the denomination of an Article Nine security interest and, depend-
ing upon the characterization of the collateral, for subjecting them to the
Article Nine perfection requirement. There are possibilities of excluding
such interests from the scope of Article Nine through an amendment to
section 9-104, or of exempting them from the burdensome filing require-
ment by amending section 9-302. A further and necessary inquiry is
whether a basis exists under the Code for excluding revenue bonds from
either the security interest denomination or the filing requirement. Such
an inquiry has relevance in determining whether amendatory legislation
is necessary and may provide a judicial rationale for excluding such
securities in the interim before such legislation can be enacted, should the
issue arise in litigation."
Perhaps the strongest basis for excluding such securities from the
operation of Article Nine is the section 9-102 (2) provision: "This
Article does not apply to statutory liens except as provided in section
9-310 [on priority of such liens]." However, section 9-102 (2) arguably
poses no bar to the inclusion of such bonds within Article Nine. Instead
of creating a statutory lien, the terms of the authorizing statutes might be
construed only as setting forth a requisite provision of the agreement to
be concluded between the contracting parties. Under such an analysis, the
lien is not deprived of its consensual character, for it is not the authorizing
statute but the agreement which creates the lien. To ascribe to the
legislature the broader purpose of creating a statutory lien seems violative
of the rule that statutes purporting to create statutory liens in derogation
of the common law are to be strictly construed.48 Furthermore, to hold
that the authorizing statute creates a statutory lien violates the provision
amendment has at least limited relevance to this state. See text accompanying note 14
supra. In any event, the exclusionary amendment could be cast in terms appropriate to
exclude a security interest of any type created by statute in public securities.
In some cases an amendment to section 9-302 would not be necessary to exempt
the security interest from the filing requirement. See G. GILMORE, supra note 6, at 549
n.2:
Many states had pre-Code statutes under which certain types of corporate
mortgages (frequently the mortgages of public utility corporations) could be
perfected by a central filing. In the Connecticut version of 9-302, such pre-Code
statutes were expressly preserved and interests subject to them exempted from
the Article nine filing provisions. Even without the express reference, such
statutes (if not repealed when the Code is enacted) would qualify as 'central
filing' statutes under section 9-302 (3) (b).
Cf. IND. ANN. STAT. § 54-513 (Burns Supp. 1968).
47. The first opportunity for the Indiana General Assembly to act would be the
1971 biennial session, barring a possible special session.
48. 18 IND. L. ENcY. Liens § 2 (1959). A statute creating a lien on the revenues
of an income-producing public enterprise would derogate the common law by imposing
a lien on public property and, under the Coogan analysis, creating a lien on property not
in esse.
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that the rights and remedies of the bondholder are to be determined by
the terms of the bonds and the ordinance implementing the issue, for such
a provision appears to prevent the authorizing statute itself from dictating
those rights and remedies. "
Moreover, even if the lien is considered statutory, the exclusion of
revenue bonds from the terms of Article Nine by reason of section 9-102
(2) does not necessarily follow, for other sections of Article Nine bear on
the question. Section 9-104(c) provides: 'i[This Article does not
apply] to a lien given by statute or other rule of law for services or
materials except as provided in section 9-310 on priority of such liens."
The section 9-104(c) provision would appear to be surplusage in view of
the section 9-102 (2) exclusion. Yet it is an elementary rule of statutory
construction that no provision of a statute shall be so construed. More
appropriately, the section 9-102 provision should be interpreted as setting
forth the broad outlines of the article, subject to the refinement of its
general terms in the subsequent sections. Section 9-104(c) can be read
as such a refinement on the subject of statutory liens. Under this
analysis, it appears that the types of statutory liens excluded are those
"for services and materials" commonly denoted "statutory liens," such as
mechanics" and materialmen's liens."
The apparent weakness of this argument is that section 9-104(c)
may be read as an extesion of section 9-102 (2) to exclude liens created
by "other rule of law," i.e., common law liens. The rejoinder is that
section 9-102 (2) by its terms is not an exclusionary provision but rather
a broad statement of the policy and scope of the article. Hence it is not
unrealistic to look to subsequent sections for a more precise understanding
of its terms. Moreover, even if section 9-104(c) is read as an extension
of section 9-102 (2) to exclude common law liens, the remaining
language of section 9-104(c) would have to be considered surplusage.
This analysis is confirmed by Professor Gilmore, who makes the
further explanation that the section 9-102 (2) provision was intended
to exclude from the Article Nine security interest denomination only
those interests classified as statutory liens under section 6 7 (c) of the
Bankruptcy Act. It is clear, he stresses, "that the section 9-102 (2)
language does not say what . . . it was meant to mean."" So construed,
49. See text accompanying note 12 supra.
50. It may be instructive that an illustrative list of statutory and common law liens
recognized in Indiana omits the types of liens under consideration here. IN. ANN. STAT.
§ 19-9-310, Indiana Comment (Burns 1964 Repl.).
51. What section 9-102(2) says is: 'This Article does not apply to statutory
liens. . . .' Section 9-104(c) says that the Article does not apply to 'a lien given
by statute or other rule of law for services or materials... !' The addition to
section 9-102(2) was obviously a hasty improvision which is somewhat lacldne
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section 9-102 (2) does not exclude those essentially consensual liens
created pursuant to statute. This approach is more in keeping with the
purpose of that section, which is "to bring all consensual security in-
terests ... with the exception of certain types of transactions excluded by
section 9-103 and 9-104, under this Article.""
Such considerations aside, the interest of the revenue bondholder can
be totally excluded from Article Nine if the bondholder is deemed to have
an interest in the revenues of the enterprise only when such revenues are
realized, the types of collateral specified in section 9-102 are considered
exclusive, and the characterization of original collateral in money as
"instruments" is found wanting. Despite the reasons for not restricting
the bondholder to an interest in accrued revenues, a court which looks no
further than the apparent meaning of the authorizing statute easily could
reach a contrary result. A basis for considering the section 9-102
categories of collateral as exhaustive can be found in section 9-105,
Comment three, which states that all intangible collateral comprehended
by the Article consists of the six types enumerated in section 9-102.
Even though the subsequent enactment of the Code might not be deemed
to incorporate the pre-existent interpretative comments, such comments
nevertheless have persuasive authority as extrinsic aids. 3 Finally, the
attempt to characterize as instruments the original collateral in money
might justifiably prove unsuccessful, especially in view of the demise of
the Silver Certificate, which best fits the characterization of money
payable in money. Even if the reveune bond cannot thus be excluded from
the Article Nine security interest denomination, it may be possible to
find a basis under the Code for exempting it from the filing requirement.
Section 9-302(1) (e) arguably could provide such a rationale, although
the comment suggests that the meaning of the language is not so broad as
it appears. "4
in elegance. Putting the references in the two sections together, we may read
them this way: the Article does not apply to the liens described in section
9-104(c)... [Emphasis added.]
G. GILM ORE, supra note 6, at 307-08.
52. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-102, Comment: Purposes.
53. "The meaning of the statute itself must be found in its text, its definitions, and
in appropriate extrinsic aids." UNIFORMA COansERICAL CODE § 1-102, Comment 2.
54. U-NIFtos COMaIERICAL CODE § 9-302 (1) (e) provides that the security interest
created in an assignment of accounts or contract rights which does not alone or in
conjunction with other assignments to the same assignee transfer a significant part of
the outstanding accounts or contract rights of the assignor need not be perfected by filing.
Since the issuing authority must regularly set aside that proportion of its prospective
revenues necessary to meet its bond obligations, (thirty per cent in the Highland, Ind.
bond issue, Highland, Ind. Ordinance 447, Dec. 19, 1960), it would appear that the
number of accounts and contract rights so designated scarcely could be described as
insignificant. At any rate, Comment five suggests that the exception is limited to "casual
or isolated assignments" and cautions that "any person who regularly takes assignments
REVENUE BOND INIESTMENTS
In lieu of the positive Code provisions recourse can be made to the
negative implications of the relevant statutes. It is arguable that revenue
bond financing is not one of those "certain well-known or institutionalized
types of financing transactions" comprehended by the Article." The
difficulties encountered in including such securities within the terms of
the Article, in view of its purported simplicity of application,:6 perhaps
suggest that they are alien to the statute. Moreover, provisions that the
rights and remedies of the bondholders aer to be determined by the terms
of the bonds and the authorizing statutes "7 might be construed to exclude
the operation of other statutes.
Any or all of the above arguments might be found to constitute a
rational basis for excepting revenue bonds from the operation of the Code.
At least, a basis might be found for exempting them from the filing
requirement. The questions which must be faced, however, are whether
the rights of the bondholder are to be subjected to the uncertainties of
Article Nine and whether revenue bond financing is to be subjected to
such potential burdens. If it is deemed desirable to rescue revenue bonds
from the vagaries of Article Nine "metaphysics""8 altogether, Indiana
should follow the lead of those states which have excluded such securities
through an amendment to section 9-104. Since the position of the Indiana
revenue bondholder would not be enhanced by the Article Nine security
interest denomination, as contrasted with his pre-Code status, 9 amend-
ment of section 9-302 should not be considered an appropriate alternative.
In any event, the issue is one which commends itself to the most thought-
ful legislative scrutiny.
Gary Dale Spivey
of any debtor's accounts should file."
A further basis for exempting such securities from the filing requirement is that the
notice requirement contemplated by the filing provision is satisfied by the fact that
statutory authority is a prerequisite to the issuance of such bonds. However, such a con-
sideration is not specifically recognized as a basis for exemption under section 9-302,
and the possibility of such an implied exception has not allayed the misgivings of states
enacting amendatory legislation.
55. See text accompanying note 6 supra.
56. "The aim of this Article is to provide a simple and unified structure within
which the immense variety of present-day financing transactions can go forward with
less cost and with greater certainty." UNIFORM CO-MMERCIAL Cona § 9-101, Comment.
57. See text accompanying note 12 supra.
58. See text accompanying note 6 supra.
59. See note 18 supra. Such enhancement would appear to be the only reason for
retaining the security interest denomination while relieving the bondholder from the
filing requirement.
